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Abstract 
Social and political sciences have discussed the issue of governance of complex 
systems for a long time, but still lack consensus on terms, mechanisms and the 
performance of different modes of governance. The paper at hand adopts an 
analytical perspective of governance and develops a general framework of it, 
rooted in a sociological macro-micro-macro model. It defines the basic mech-
anisms “control” and “coordination” and depicts “governance” as a specific 
combination of these basic mechanisms in multi-level socio-technical systems. 
We claim that successful governance has to solve several problems simultane-
ously: the governance of singular levels within a multi-level architecture as well 
as the interplay between them. The heuristic value of this framework will be 
demonstrated by the sample of modern infrastructure systems (e.g. aviation or 
energy grids). Here we typically observe a combination of three distinct levels: 
the coordination in negotiation processes, the regulation of functional subsys-
tems of society, and the operational control of these systems. 
Keywords or phrases 
governance, control, coordination, complexity, multi-level model 
1 Introduction 
Modern societies are characterized by an increasing complexity. Non-linear 
processes in economy, society, ecology, and others are hardly controllable, 
especially because of their interdependencies. In the 1990s, Helmut Willke 
already warned that societies run the risk “to lose control of themselves” 
(1989: 55) and to produce irreversible, self-endangering risks. In so far, it 
seems reasonable to look for political options of “civilising evolution” (ibid.) 
and simultaneously for theoretical starting-points regarding the governance of 
complex systems (cf. Loorbach 2007). 
The latter issue has been debated in social sciences as well as in natural scienc-
es for a long time (cf. Duit/Galaz 2008). Many researchers have pointed to the 
limits of control of complex systems, which are rooted among others in the 
(partial) intransparencies of processes and self-referential mechanisms. 
The sceptical view 
Niklas Luhmann has always argued that the concept of control “strongly con-
flicts with the fact of functional differentiation” (1988: 325). In contrast, Willke 
developed the concept of decentralised context control (1989: 58), which has 
recently been translated into “smart governance” (2007), thus pointing to a 
certain degree of controllability of societal systems in spite of functional differ-
entiation. However, from an action theory perspective, Uwe Schimank (2005) 
claims an inverse relation of complexity and rationality: The more complex a 
situation is, the less rational are decisions. 
The notion of uncontrollable complex systems can also be found in social 
studies of technology. In his fourfold scheme, Charles Perrow (1984) has iden-
tified a type of high-risk systems, which is characterised by complex interac-
tions and tight coupling. According to his analysis, accidents in these systems 
are unavoidable, leading him to the conclusion that they should be abandoned. 
The optimistic view 
On the other hand, we find a cautious optimism in terms of control, mostly 
combined with the plea for alternative modes of governance, which make use 
of decentralised self-organization and non-hierarchical coordination (Kooiman 
et al. 2008). Mixed-mode concepts claim that organizations can operate in dif-
ferent governance modes (hierarchy, self-organization etc.) either by combin-
ing these modes or switching between them (Duit/Galaz 2008). 
For example, the high-reliability theory has identified a certain type of organi-
zation (HROs), which is able to successfully manage complex high-risk sys-
tems and to avoid normal accidents (Roberts 1993). 
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The multi-level model of governance 
From our point of view, basic knowledge about the functioning and govern-
ance of these socio-technical systems is required in order to answer the ques-
tion of their governability. Referring to the long-lasting debates and open-
ended controversies on governance and control, we firstly will show that a 
deepened understanding of socio-technical systems’ governance is still missing 
(cf. Section 2).1  Secondly, we will propose a multi-level model of governance 
as an analytical framework, which tries to clarify conceptual issues to reconcile 
different notions of governance, and to finally provide a means to investigate 
governance issues systematically. 
This multi-level model will be developed in two steps: 
First, a general framework of governance will be depicted, rooted in a socio-
logical macro-micro-macro model, showing the interplay of structure and ac-
tion. This general framework defines “control” and “coordination” as basic 
mechanisms, which can be combined at different levels in various ways. Hence 
the term “governance” refers to a specific combination of these basic mecha-
nisms in a social or socio-technical system (cf. Section 3). 
Second, the heuristic value of this framework will be demonstrated by a sample 
configuration of governance, namely the case of air traffic control in Europe. 
When applied to modern infrastructure systems (e.g. aviation, road transporta-
tion, energy grids), we typically observe a combination of three distinct levels 
(cf. Section 4): 
1. coordination processes in negotiation systems, 
2. regulation of functional societal systems, 
3. operational control of these systems. 
This model represents a specific combination of the basic mechanisms of con-
trol and coordination in a multi-level structure. It proposes that the basic 
mechanisms not only have to work properly (on each level). Furthermore, 
mechanisms on different levels have to interact well in order to get the system 
running and guarantee successful governance. The model thus focuses on the 
interplay between several mechanisms, trying to bridge the gap between differ-
ent notions and concepts. 
2 State of the art in governance research 
In spite of long-lasting debates on “control” and “governance”, there is only 
little consensus in social sciences concerning the meaning and scope of both 
concepts. There can even be found a certain disillusion about the output of 20 
                                                 
1 We define systems as follows: Social systems are self-organizing entities, which are constitut-
ed by actors’ interactions. Socio-technical systems additionally include a variety of non-human 
agents. Because of non-linear internal process, both types can be regarded as complex systems. 
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years of governance research, since “important empirical and theoretical ques-
tions in this area have not been answered until now” (Grande 2012: 566). 
Frequently, the terms “governance” and “control” are used as a synonym 
(Benz et al. 2007: 18), which partly refers to problems transferring the terms 
between different languages.2 Some authors explicitly differentiate between 
both concepts, demarcating the traditional interventionist control (“Steuer-
ung”) of the 1970s, in relation to new modes of governance. 
2.1 Notions of governance 
Basically, two perspectives on governance can be differentiated: the analytical 
approach including a neutral notion of governance, and the normative ap-
proach which points out substantial changes of societal coordination (Grande 
2012: 567). 
The analytical approach 
Mayntz has defined governance as “the entire spectrum of coexisting modes of 
collective regulation of societal issues” (2004: 5). From this perspective, gov-
ernance is a meta-category that comprises different modes of coordination, 
control and others. Schimank also regards governance as “an analytic perspec-
tive” which focuses on “patterns of coping with interdependencies of actors” 
(2007: 29). 
Arthur Benz et al. also use the term “for all forms and mechanisms of coordi-
nation between more or less autonomous actors, whose actions are interde-
pendent …” (2007: 9). 
The analytical perspective of governance thus subsumes every mode of societal 
coordination without evaluating these different forms of coping with interde-
pendencies. This neutral approach is capable of seeing a wide variety of gov-
ernance phenomena but provokes the question if we need a new term – and 
what is the added value. Concepts as coordination, actor constellation, social 
network, and others are well-established means to analyse patterns of actor 
interdependencies as well. 
The normative approach 
Some authors describe the transition from traditional interventionist control 
(“Steuerung”) to governance as a societal learning process which gave rise to 
new modes of non-hierarchical coordination, including non-governmental, 
societal actors (Schultze 2013). Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf (1995) point 
to growing problems of political control and the increasing capabilities of soci-
etal self-control, arguing that negotiation systems in which public and private 
actors interact in solving societal problems might be a solution (Scharpf 1993). 
                                                 
2 For example, in German, a verb related to the noun “governance” does not exist, and the 
German verb "steuern" can be translated as "to control", “to steer”, "to govern", “to manage”, 
and many more. 
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They use the term “governance” to demarcate this contemporary mode of 
coordination of strategically acting actors, e.g. in policy networks, where the 
state is only one of several co-players (cf. also Kooiman et al. 2008, 
Duit/Galaz 2008). 
The normative approach also rates this development positively as an “expres-
sion of modernity” (Haus 2010: 459), because governance results in “an in-
crease of efficiency of the policy outcome” (Schultze 2013: 570, cf. Kooiman 
et al. 2008: 2f.). 
The analytic notion of governance, mentioned afore, has a wide scope; it com-
prises different forms of societal coordination and refrains from substantial 
descriptions and normative evaluations. In contrast, the normative approach 
has a narrow scope, because it reserves the term “governance” for one specific 
mechanism of coordination, namely the non-hierarchical coordination of pub-
lic and private actors, which is regarded as a well-suited means of dealing with 
the issue of complexity. However, claiming the superiority of one singular 
mode of coordination puts a high burden of proof on researchers devoted to 
the normative approach. 
Furthermore, the question of the added value of the new term arises again, 
since the policy-network approach is a well-established concept of analysing 
non-hierarchical coordination. 
Since both terms – governance and network – are frequently used inter-
changeably (Knill/Schäfer 2011), one might suspect they mean the same, rais-
ing the question why a new term is needed (Torfing et al. 2012: 13). However, 
if policy networks serve as an instrument of modern governance, the relation 
of both concepts still has to be clarified. 
Interim conclusion 
As the brief outlook of governance research has shown, the result is in some 
regard disappointing: Basic terms are defined and related to each other various-
ly. Neither of the two approaches has convincingly demonstrated the need for 
and the added value of the new term.  
Nevertheless, from the discussion of these concepts, we can learn that govern-
ance theory deals with various mechanisms of societal coordination. Further-
more, it might be wise to refrain from normative statements about the superi-
ority of modes and to leave this question to empirical research. 
2.2 Modes of governance 
Empirical research on governance issues might expect some theoretical hints 
about how to identify and to distinguish different modes of governance, be 
they old or new ones. Unfortunately, neither governance nor management 
research have reached a consensus about (i) the number and the characteristics 
of different governance modes as well as about (ii) the methods of classifica-
tion or typologies (Wiesenthal 2000). 
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Classifications and typologies 
Many researchers start with the classic triad of market, hierarchy (or organiza-
tion) and network (or community), but assume that in practice different mech-
anisms are mixed “under the rules of the leading principle” (Wiesenthal 2000: 
47). 
In order to identify these combinations of ideal type mechanisms, Volker 
Schneider and Johannes Bauer constructed a two-dimensional space with the 
two axes “mode of coordination” and “mode of property rights”, resulting in 
five different types (2009). Willke’s axes are labelled “autonomy” and “coher-
ence”, leading to a number of hybrid forms in between the three classic modes 
(1995: 139). Moreover, Andreas Duit and Victor Galaz (2008: 323) present two 
axes labelled “exploitation” and “exploration”, resulting in four governance 
types (rigid, robust, flexible, fragile) with various adaptive capacities. 
The concepts presented here obviously start with different problem definitions 
and thus are hardly comparable. The classificatory work mostly results in ana-
lytic combinations, which, however, have neither been completely discovered 
in reality nor yet sufficiently investigated.  
Furthermore, except from classifying these new modes and types, it mostly 
remains unresolved how exactly these combinations work, if, for example, 
partly contradictory demands of market and hierarchy are mingled. Additional-
ly, empirical research is not provided with indicators that can be operational-
ized in a way that helps identifying specific types in practice. 
New (mixed) modes of governance 
New modes of governance have mostly been characterised as mixed types in 
between decentralised self-organization (market) and centralised control (hier-
archy) – sometimes labelled “third way” – or “smart” combinations of these 
basic principles (Willke 1989: 57, Duit et al. 2010: 366, Hillman et al. 2011). 
Management research has identified “mixed scanning” (Etzioni 1967) as a third 
way between rationalism and incrementalism. Similarly, “transition manage-
ment for sustainable development” (Loorbach 2007) has been proposed as a 
third way of governing the transformation of complex systems, which reaches 
beyond planning and self-organization. Finally, “loose coupling” (in terms of 
Karl Weick) has been conceived of a means of combining the strengths of 
central planning and flexible crisis management in high-risk organizations 
(Grote 2009). 
Management research argues that complexity can be managed better if new 
(mixed) modes of governance are applied, that come about by combining old 
modes or by switching between them – which points to the importance of 
organizational culture. 
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Governance research has also induced a variety of new concepts: 
 “Polycentric governance” (Ostrom 2010) asserts that the participation 
of a great variety of public and private actors may lead to superior solu-
tions; 
 “interactive governance” is rather similar, pointing to the interaction of  
“a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests” 
(Torfing et al. 2012: 13), participating in problem solving; 
 the same applies to “heterarchical governance”, which is kind of a hor-
izontal self-organization, to “network-based governance”, and to “co-
governance” (Duit/Galaz 2008: 317, 323f.); 
 “meta-governance” (Jessop 2011, Loorbach 2007), or “smart govern-
ance” (Willke 2007), differs insofar, as it is conceptualized as “the gov-
ernance of governance” (Torfing et al. 2012: 144) – or in older terms: 
the cautious moderation of self-organised processes by public agencies 
in order to ensure that decentralized coordination leads to acceptable 
results from a common welfare oriented perspective (cf. Mayntz 1993). 
Altogether, most concepts presented here resemble the normative approach of 
non-hierarchical coordination in actor networks (cf. Section 2.1). These new 
modes of governance are usually presented as abstract, ideal-type concepts, 
which leaves the question of operationalization and empirical identification 
unresolved (as well as the one of differentiation from other types). 
Interim conclusion 
The research overview on modes of governance has shown that there is 
“something” in between old and new modes that is worth being investigated 
more thoroughly. At this moment, this “something” can best be described as a 
combination of different social mechanisms. However, concepts still lack pre-
cision, and methods to study this issue empirically are rather rare. 
2.3 Measuring governance 
As mentioned before, many researchers are in favour of one particular mode 
of governance because it is supposed to deliver better results than others. In 
order to assess the performance of different governance modes, we need crite-
ria and indicators to measure their success. 
Coping with complexity 
First of all, the ability to cope with complexity is a major criterion to measure 
the performance of governance, which is mostly tested by means of compara-
tive case studies. Once more, we find only limited consensus. 
Some researchers argue that decentralized self-organization (bottom-up) is 
superior to other modes, e.g. central planning (top-down) (Resnick 1995), be-
cause “diversity and decentralization increase the capacity of governance sys-
tems to handle complex systems” (Duit et al. 2010: 366). 
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Other researchers point out the context which sometimes may favour central 
control (as in the case of mass production in stable environments) and decen-
tralized coordination at other times (as in the case of innovation in turbulent 
environments) (Powell 1990: 393). The speed of change and the predictability 
of events are also factors that influence the performance of different govern-
ance modes, as Duit and Galaz (2008) have shown (cf. Section 2.2).  
However, these controversies on capabilities of different modes of governance 
to cope with complexity have never generated precise indicators that might 
help to solve the issue. 
Indicators of successful governance 
In order to evaluate the performance of different governance modes, govern-
ance research needs methods and techniques to measure performance, output, 
and success of governance in a methodologically sound way (Duit/Galaz 
2008). Unfortunately, only few hints can be found in the current governance 
research. Duit et al. complain: 
“We currently have very little systematic knowledge about how different types 
of real-world governance systems differ in their ability to cope with different 
types of complex change.” (2010: 366) 
Schimank refers to the effective “coping with interdependence” as a criterion 
for successful governance or the “capacity of order” (Ordnungsleistung), to be 
measured by the “criterion of collective capacity to act” (kollektive Handlungs-
fähigkeit) (2007: 34f.). Although pointing at the necessity to distinguish be-
tween indicators on the system and the actor level, his suggestions remain very 
abstract, leaving a transfer to empirical research strategies rather difficult. The 
same applies to Wiesenthal, who lists the efficiency of coordination, the “ro-
bustness”, “reliability”, “continuity”, but also “actors’ autonomy” and “actors’ 
identity” (Wiesenthal 2000: 60). 
Duit and Galaz rate certain types of governance positively (robust type) and 
other negatively (fragile type), without elaborating their criteria of assessment 
(Duit/Galaz 2008: 323). The only hint is the ability to balance the contradicto-
ry needs of stability and flexibility (Duit et al. 2010: 366) – once more a very 
abstract statement not suited for empirical operationalization. 
A more detailed elaboration of criteria for “measuring goverance” can be 
found in the book of Jacob Torfing et al. (2012: Chapter 4), who enumerate 
the following indicators: 
 processes, above all the implementation of political goals (p. 80f.); 
 outputs in terms of payoffs and the establishment of regulatory institu-
tions (p. 81f.); 
 outcomes in terms of goal achievement and legitimacy (p. 82f.); 
 normative criteria in terms of fair procedures (p. 83f.). 
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This list might serve as a first step towards measurable indicators that can be 
used by empirical research, since it points at the need to create different indica-
tors to qualitatively measure processes and other indicators quantitatively. Yet, 
the actor perspective is missing here. 
As long as it cannot be managed to establish measurable indicators, govern-
ance research will not be able to demonstrate the efficiency of its research ob-
ject and to answer the question “if governance really contributes positively to 
solving regulation problems of modern contemporary societies” (Grande 2012: 
577). 
Modelling (complex) socio-technical systems 
The inability of governance research to name dependent and independent vari-
ables and to assess relations between them (Torfing et al. 2012: 78f.) is rooted 
in an underlying conceptual problem: the missing model of a socio-technical 
system and its internal mechanisms, resulting in a lacking understanding of the 
impact of interventions into the system. To quote Edgar Grande: 
“It would be even more important to know, how different elements of govern-
ance … interact, which internal dynamics and external effects arise, and how this 
affects the performance capability [of the system]…” (Grande 2012: 578, 
emphasis in original) 
According to Grande, the main gaps are insufficient knowledge about the 
“mechanisms of action” (Wirkungsmechanismen) and particularly about the 
“interaction of different mechanisms” (ibid.). However, this knowledge is a 
prerequisite to answer questions about the performance capabilities of govern-
ance regimes or modes (cf. Haus 2010). 
One reason for this deficit might be that governance research typically does 
not evaluate the effects of specific kinds of interventions directly, but the insti-
tutional design of actor networks and its presumed (indirect) effects on sys-
tems’ performance instead (Haus 2010: 459, 470, Grande 2012: 577). 
Interim conclusion 
The critical review of concepts measuring governance has revealed that basic 
components to methodologically sound investigate this issue are still missing, 
namely: a model of the socio-technical system, as well as precisely defined indi-
cators that can be operationalized for empirical research. 
However, some hints are valuable, especially the insight that modelling govern-
ance has to reflect its multi-level architecture, which contains at least two lev-
els:  
Schimank, Wiesenthal, Torfing et al. propose to differentiate the system and 
the actor level. Grande and Haus on the other hand focus on the negotiation 
system’s level (actor network) and the one of the system being influenced. 
Hence, on both levels, performance indicators may be (i) goal achievement and 
payoffs, (ii) the collective capacity to act in face of complexity, and (iii) institu-
tionalization and legitimacy. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
In spite of many unresolved debates and lacking consensus concerning the 
meaning of central terms, the overview of governance research has demon-
strated the importance of a new phenomenon anywhere “in between”. Its in-
vestigation requires taking a look at mechanisms as well as combining various 
mechanisms within a multi-level structure. Therefore, it might be wise to re-
frain from normative statements for now, leaving the question of the best per-
forming combination to empirical research, using precisely defined measurable 
indicators. We will take all these aspects into account when constructing our 
multi-level model of governance. 
3 A general framework of governance of socio-
technical systems 
3.1 Governance-Modi 
The next section will present basic elements of a framework to analyse socio-
technical systems and their governance. The fundamental idea is: Modelling the 
processes (of decision making, interaction, structuring etc.) inside the levels has 
to be complemented by modelling the interplay between the different levels.  
This allows assessing the impact of external events or efforts in order to influ-
ence or control the system. 
3.2 Basic model of a socio-technical system 
Our starting point is a model of a social or socio-technical system that contains 
the components (actors), the rules of (inter-)action, and the mechanism of 
structure formation, which are presented in a formal, theory-based language 
(Hedström/Swedberg 1996). We refer to the macro-micro-macro-model of 
James Coleman (1990), the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
framework of Elinor Ostrom (2005, 2010), and the model of social explanation 
(MSE) of Hartmut Esser (1993a). Very similar, all three models include as-
sumptions about the logic of action (Ostrom 2010: 6f., 19ff.), the logic of the 
situation (p. 12, 22f.), as well as the interrelation of these two levels by means 
of a macro-micro-macro model (Esser 1993a, Kooiman et al. 2008). 
Figure 1 presents Esser’s version of this idea, but Ostrom’s version (2010: 6, 8) 
is rather similar: 
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The figure starts with the system structure at point in time tx, which is per-
ceived by actors as the situational context which constraints their room for 
manoeuvre. These actors pursue individual goals and take decisions in a rule-
based manner (in Esser’s concept, they select the option resulting in the maxi-
mum subjectively expected utility). Since a large number of heterogeneous 
agents act and interact at the micro level, it is difficult to predict which choices 
they make and how they mutually influence each other. 
Finally, in form of the aggregated result of these interactions, a new system 
structure at point of time tx+1 emerges, which is the starting point of the next 
round. Actors at the micro level are thus constrained by the system, but they 
also shape and dynamically change the system at the macro level – mostly in a 
way that is hardly predictable and can only be grasped in form of the unintend-
ed result evoked by intentional actions. 
This textbook version of a macro-micro-macro model, in which actors act and 
interact uncoordinatedly and the system structure emerges spontaneously from 
their interactions, will serve as starting point for more elaborated extensions, 
applying this model to the study of governance in the next subsections. 
3.3 Governance 
The overview of governance research in Section 2 has firstly demonstrated that 
it is a risky strategy (with a high burden of proof) to assign the term “govern-
ance” to one specific mode of societal coordination. Secondly, it has highlight-
ed the importance of an analytic perspective that puts emphasis on social 
mechanisms and such dynamics (cf. also Kalter/Kroneberg 2014). Thirdly, it 
has clearly shown that pure, textbook forms of either control or coordination 
can rarely be observed in practice, but a rather large variety of combinations 
instead (Duit/Galaz 2008: 327, Grande 2012: 582). Fourthly, finally, the out-
look has demonstrated the importance of multi-level concepts of governance. 
Figure 1: A macro-micro-macro model (Esser 1993a) 
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Definition 
Hence we propose an analytical definition that allows an open-minded investi-
gation of different pattern as follows: 
(DEF-1) The term “governance” depicts a specific combination of the basic 
mechanisms control and coordination in multi-level socio tech-
nical systems. 
According to this formal definition, the basic mechanisms can be combined 
differently, be it horizontally (within levels) or vertically (between those).3 Yet, 
in practice, specific combinations of mechanisms (or at least parts of it) are 
typically set up intentionally as a means of creating or maintaining social order 
in a functional societal system – even though the emergent result can only part-
ly be related to the creator’s intentions. 
Levels can be interpreted as any kind of layered structure of or within socio-
technical systems, e.g. analytical (micro – meso – macro), territorial (transna-
tional – national – local), or organizational (top management – middle man-
agement – operations) ones (cf. Fernández-Ribas 2009).  
As presented by the sample in Figure 2, the mechanisms work in a twofold 
manner: They rule the internal operations of the respective subsystem and they 
can be used to influence other subsystems, which on their part are guided by 
an internal mechanism, and – with regard to their openness or closeness – can 
react differently to external attempts of control or coordination (Luhmann 
1990). Of course, feedback loops between levels might also be added, as al-
ready suggested in the basic macro-micro-macro model (cf. Section 3.1). 
Figure 2 suggests vertical lines to stand for control and horizontal lines to rep-
resent coordination; however, the way these mechanisms work in a specific 
constellation is an open question which can only be resolved empirically. 
One can zoom into a specific subsystem and detect more details within the 
multi-layered internal governance structure. Otherwise, one can zoom out at a 
higher aggregation level and neglect these details. 
Our general framework intends to provide the ground for empirical investiga-
tions and refrains from asserting which combination may function in practice 
and perform best. We merely assume that in practice we will find a number of 
ideal-type constellations which have proofed their performance through a spe-
cific combination of mechanisms. 
                                                 
3 Hillmann et al. (2011: 409) also propose a set of four basic mechanisms, but in an either-or 
style, which does not look for combinations. 
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A second assumption is: In practice we will only seldom find a constellation 
based on merely one single mechanism, and rather observe a variety of mix-
tures and combinations. This assertion has far-reaching consequences for gov-
ernance theory, since empirically observed effects can no longer be related to 
one singular mode of governance, but to a specific combination of mechanisms, 
which derives its strength (or weakness) as well from control as from coordina-
tion. 
In order to model this concept (see Section 4), we firstly have to define the 
basic mechanisms more precisely. 
3.4 Control (“Steuerung”) 
Inspite of long-lasting debates on steering and control, especially in German 
sociology, the term has only seldom been defined. For example, Luhmann 
defines steering as “minimizing a difference” (1988: 388), namely into a distinct 
direction. His illustrations (“steering of a car”, 326) just like his self-description 
as “second order cybernetics” (334) show that his notion of steering has been 
derived from control engineering and that he applies a – surprisingly – inten-
tional notion of control. 
Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) are representatives of an intentional concept of 
steering in terms of a dedicated shaping and reshaping of social systems. Willke 
takes a middle position, accepting “interventions into autonomous systems” 
(1989: 133) if the problem of translating “external stimuli into internal infor-
mation” (134) can be solved. 
Definition 
Referring to Mayntz, Scharpf and Willke we define control as follows: 
(DEF-2) Control shall be the intentional intervention into socio-technical 
systems, aiming at producing intended effects. 
Figure 2: A sample combination of systems and mechanisms 
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Steering thus is no trivial undertaking, since – as Willke and Luhmann argue – 
the system to be steered may not be able to process external interventions or 
even actively resists to them. Our notion of control thus comprises all attempts 
to achieve effects in a socio-technical system, which is not necessarily bound to 
the successful realization of steering intentions in terms of a factual generation 
of intended effects (cf. Willke 1989: 133f.).4 System theory puts emphasis on 
systemic effects of external intervention and thus takes up a sceptical view. In 
contrast, from an action theoretical perspective, we focus on intentional ac-
tions to control systems irrespectively of their success or their – partly unin-
tended – consequences. In this model, every actor – not only the state – may 
act as controller and simultaneously may become object of control strategies of 
other actors (Weyer 1997). 
To this regard, control always entails the risk of failure – be it complete failure 
or partial one, e.g. in form of partial implementation of plans or compromises 
with other actors, who are part of the game as well. 
Boundary conditions 
In addition to definition (DEF-2), we need two more boundary conditions: 
(BC-1) Control is a unidirectional relation between a steering subject and 
an object-to-be-controlled. 
Control typically is exerted by an individual or corporate actor (which is locat-
ed within a socio-technical system) who assumes to have a privileged position 
that enables her or him to influence or to constrain the (systemic) context of 
other actors, while conversely being – at least partly – autonomous, i.e. not 
dependent on these other actors. Control thus supposes an asymmetrical rela-
tion between two social systems. 
The analytical distinction between steering subject and the object-to-be-
controlled (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995: 10) is a central cornerstone of a model of 
governance (Kooiman et al. 2008: 3, Hillman et al. 2011). It is even reasonable 
in the case of self-control, when actors play different roles at once: the control-
ler and the object-to-be-controlled. 
 (BC-2) Control functions via incentives, provided by the steering subject, 
which shape the situational context of the objects-to-be-controlled 
and thus leave these objects a leeway to choose between different 
alternatives. 
The second boundary condition refers to the system theoretical concept of 
system autonomy, which argues that no external power can force a system to 
change its operations, but can only change situational parameters in a way that 
                                                 
4 Our notion of control is thus closely related to Schimank’s “constellation of influence” (Be-
einflussungskonstellation) (2010: 267ff.). 
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makes reactions on part of the system-to-be-controlled more likely (Luhmann 
1990, Willke 1995).  
However, this concept is complemented by – and rather fits well to – an action 
theoretical notion of decision-making, which is rooted in the general model of 
a socio-technical system (see Section 3.1). 
According to this model, strategic actors at the system’s micro level pursue 
goals and take subjectively rational decisions based on their preferences as well 
as on the given situational constraints. Actors are constrained by the current 
situation, but not totally determined. They have a certain leeway to make their 
own choices, which also include the freedom to decide to which extent steer-
ing interventions may shape one’s own choices.  
Furthermore, we assume that incentives may differ according to their strength, 
ranging from soft measures (e.g. stimuli) to strong measures (e.g. constraints). 
However, the actors’ freedom to comply (or not to comply) to control does 
both apply in the case of soft and strong control (cf. Kooiman et al. 2008: 8). 
Actors may decide (differently) on how to cope with these measures. Insofar 
every attempt to control a socio-technical system entails the risk of failure – at 
least as long as actors are not put to a strait jacket. 
To conclude: Control is a unidirectional interaction between a steering subject 
and one or several objects to be controlled. However, in most cases, the final 
objective of control is not the individual behaviour, but a desired state of the 
system (e.g. reducing CO2-emissions in transportation) – this shall be achieved 
by a “detour” via the actors’ behaviour (e.g. switching to carbon-free modes of 
transport). Even if control affects the actors, its effects are mostly measured on 
the system level as aggregated result of the actions and interactions of a large 
number of actors. 
Objectives of control 
At latest when assessing the success of control, one has to define its goals, 
which may be either maintaining system stability (e.g. avoiding traffic jams) or 
changing the system (e.g. replacing fossils by renewable energies). In the first, 
case controllers operate by means of negative feedback, trying to damp down 
fluctuations and to maintain normal operations (or to recover as soon as pos-
sible after an incident) (Duit et al. 2010). In the second case, controllers create 
incentives that shall bring actors to change their individual behaviour, thus 
producing a dynamic that leads to a systems’ transformation in the long run 
(e.g. in terms of sustainability) (Loorbach 2007). Yet, even in a period of rapid 
change, the operativeness of the system has to be constantly maintained 
(Duit/Galaz 2008: 320). 
Modelling control  
The macro-micro-macro model, depicted in Section 3.1, will help us to model 
the mechanism of control more precisely, as Figure 3 shows. 
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In this sense, control is an attempt of external actors (in system A, e.g. climate 
policy), to purposely influence the state and the processes of system B (e.g. 
aviation). In an action theoretical perspective, control is mostly exerted indirectly 
by changing the situational parameters of system B at point of time tx, which 
are part of the actors decision-making and thus enabling the controller to 
achieve the presumed outcome at point of time tx+1 via this “de-
tour”. However, it is hard to predict (and even more difficult to control), 
whether system B produces the desired outcome or rather unintended effects. 
Of course it is possible to zoom into system A in order to see the internal mac-
ro-micro-macro processes more detailed and to achieve a better understanding 
of how the decision to control system B has emerged (see Figure 4). 
Finally, different feedbacks are conceivable, for example when the output of 
system B at point of time tx+3 (e.g. delays in aviation) triggers decision-making 
in system A at point of time tx+4 (e.g. climate or transportation policy). 
Even without any (purposeful) control activities and only “normal” operations, 
different systems mutually influence each other, shaping the other systems’ 
context. However, dedicated control activities enforce this mechanism and can 
thus be used to purposefully change things. 
This model presents control as a purposeful shaping of other systems from an 
external point of view, which even applies if the controller (e.g. a politician) is 
also part of the controlled system (e.g. a car driver) and thus plays different 
roles. However, given the desire to exert influence, one has to put oneself into 
an external reflexive position. 
Figure 3: Model of control 
 
 
22                                                      Johannes Weyer, Fabian Adelt, Sebastian Hoffmann 
3.5 Coordination 
In contrast to control, coordination is decentralized and multidirectional. A 
multitude of actors participate in negotiation and coordination processes. All 
participants are – more or less – equally-ranked steering subjects (cf. Habermas 
1970), who try to mutually influence each other, none of them being in a privi-
leged position to control other actors unidirectionally (cf. Mayntz 1993, Willke 
1995). This notion of coordination is rather close to the above mentioned con-
cept of “interactive governance” (Torfing et al. 2012, Kooiman et al. 2008). 
Hence we define coordination as follows: 
(DEF-3) Coordination shall be the mutual adjustment of heterogeneous 
actors aiming at collectively solving problems in a way that is ac-
ceptable to all parties involved. 
The most common way to accomplish this task, is to take into account the 
others’ perspectives while interacting, which goes along with Max Weber’s 
definition of social action as “actor’s behaviour [that] is meaningfully oriented 
to that of others” (1968: 23, cf. also Schimank 2010: 38ff.).  
We further distinguish different types of coordination: 
 spontaneous coordination, as in the Weberian example of two bicyclists 
who approach each other and manage to coordinate their actions. 
 reflexive coordination as in the case of actors in policy or innovation net-
works who are partly motivated by reaching a consensus, i.e. a com-
mon problem solution.5 
                                                 
5 Spontaneous coordination thus resembles Schimank’s (2010)„constellation of observation“ 
(Beobachtungskonstellation, p. 226ff.), while reflexive coordination resembles the „constella-
tion of negotiation“ (Verhandlungskonstellation, p. 305ff.). 
Figure 4: Control in a multi-level configuration 
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The first case typically covers a short period of time and the actors involved 
pursue individual goals only. Furthermore, they mostly react to a given situa-
tion in an automatic-spontaneous mode (Kroneberg 2014), and optimize their 
outcomes locally, not taking into account external effects. 
The second kind is rather long-range, covering all kinds of strategic action that 
take into account the presumed actions and reactions of (several) fellow actors 
in a rationally calculating mode (Habermas 1970, Kroneberg 2014). Common 
goals and external effects may become more important, and optimization is 
attained rather indirectly. The most important feature of this type of coordina-
tion is its reflexive capability, i.e. the ability to anticipate the following steps in 
a rationally calculating manner and to take into account what other actors 
might be doing next. 
Modelling coordination 
The mechanism of coordination can be modelled as an adjusted version of the 
basic macro-micro-macro model. Spontaneous coordination is to be depicted 
as a sequence of decision-making processes, linked to each other in a short 
period of time, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Actor B acts in a situation that has been shaped by actor A’s conduct and vice 
versa. Both actors reciprocally adapt to each other, because everyone is pursu-
ing one’s own goals individually, though dependent on the other’s cooperation. 
The second type, reflexive coordination, is more complicated, since actors not 
only take into account the current structure of the system at point in time tx, 
when defining the situation. They also consider the existence of co-actors, ass-
es their past (inter-)actions, try to anticipate their future actions (and presumed 
reactions to own actions), and consequently reflexively bear in mind these 
facts, too. 
Referring to Esser’s multi-level model (1993b: 113) and previous attempts of 
Robin Fink and Johannes Weyer (2014) to apply this model to hybrid interac-
tions of humans and machines, we propose the illustration presented in Figure 
6. 
 
  
Figure 5: Spontaneous coordination 
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As in the basic model, actor A perceives and interprets the current situation 
(arrow 1), but additionally s/he is particularly sensitive to actor B’s conduct 
and results from past interactions (arrow 2) and takes both factors – as well as 
anticipated events in the future (arrow 3) – into consideration. Since actor B is 
behaving alike simultaneously, a meso structure in between the macro and mi-
cro level emerges which influences the actors’ choices as well. Hence, each 
actor not only takes into account the situational parameters (arrow 1), but also 
the prevailing state of the interaction system at the meso level (arrow 2).  
The two models of spontaneous and reflexive coordination differ to that re-
gard that spontaneous coordination typically is more sequential and does not 
reflect long-term aspects, while reflexive coordination is more simultaneous 
and reflects the existence of an interaction system at the meso level as well as 
the outcome of the next and second-next step. 
3.6 Relating control and coordination 
Despite the analytical distinction between “control” and “coordination”, the 
interrelatedness of both concepts is obvious, since in many cases coordination 
is no end in itself, but serves as a means of control. This would be the case 
when different parties agree (via coordination) to take measures to influence a 
system (via control). We will come back to this point in Section 4, where we 
will present exemplary combinations of coordination and control. 
Surprisingly, even the formal differences between the control and the coordina-
tion mechanism partly seem to dissolve. Control has been defined as attempt 
to influence a system’s behaviour from an external point of view, which in-
cludes changing primarily situational parameters of the object-to-be-controlled, 
namely the actors. 
However, coordination works similarly. Several actors try to mutually influence 
one another by changing situational parameters. Indeed, the actors are part of 
the same system and exchange resources reciprocally, guided by common ob-
jectives and the mutual acceptance of equal standing. 
Figure 6: Reflexive coordination 
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In model-building purpose, control and coordination can therefore formally be 
constructed as two extreme points of one basic mechanism, namely the inten-
tional shaping of fellow actors’ boundary conditions, in order to achieve one’s 
own goals. The remaining difference between the two concepts is the actor’s 
strength to reciprocally define their situations and thus to influence their be-
haviour, so to speak the degree of asymmetry in terms of power and resources. 
In a formal model, we consequently can implement only one mechanism and 
cover the scale between ‘pure’ control and ‘pure’ coordination by adjusting the 
parameters ‘power’, ‘external/internal’, and ‘reflexiveness’. 
4 Modelling multi-level governance 
In the next step, we will be putting all the pieces together, integrating them 
into a multi-level model of governance. Air traffic control (ATC) in Europe 
will serve as an example to briefly demonstrate its analytic value. 
4.1 “Regelungsstruktur” and “Leistungsstruktur” 
In order to achieve this integration task, we refer to Mayntz and Scharpf (1995: 
16), who investigated functional societal systems as education, transportation, 
health, etc. in a governance perspective, and proposed the analytical distinction 
between 
 the “control structure” (Regelungsstruktur), where different actors co-
ordinate themselves in multi-lateral negotiation systems including pub-
lic and private actors, 
 and the “performance structure” (Leistungsstruktur) of these function-
al societal systems. 
Successful governance thus has to solve two problems simultaneously (Lütz 
1995: 171f.): 
 the definition of control goals with the aid of coordination in a negotia-
tion system 
 and the implementation of these control goals via regulating the func-
tional system in order to change its status. 
However, referring to Kooiman et al., the “governability of a societal system” 
depends on the “system-to-be-governed”, the “governing system”, “and the 
relation between the two” (2008: 3f.) – which means that three components 
are required instead of only two. 
The missing third level 
Going beyond Mayntz and Scharpf, we insert a third level to grasp the opera-
tional processes within the functional systems, which on their part produce a 
governance problem as well (GOV-3). The members of a negotiation system 
(GOV-1) mostly do not directly affect the actors’ behaviour in functional sys-
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tems through regulation, but typically set up regulations and specialized, inter-
mediate institutions (GOV-2), which for their part provide the framework for 
operational control of the systems-to-be-governed (GOV-3). 
Figure 7 presents a sample multi-level model of governance of socio-technical 
infrastructure systems as in the case of air traffic control (ATC) in Europe. 
 
4.2 Air traffic control in Europe 
At the first level, we find actors negotiating policies, e.g. national governments, 
industrial and other societal stakeholders (GOV-1). Since the late 1990s, the 
issues at stake had been a fragmented air space in Europe, lacking buffers to 
handle the predicted growing air traffic in future decades, and also increasing 
environmental and safety concerns (Button/Neiva 2013). The goals set for 
future aviation in Europe were to increase capacities and cost-efficiency and 
simultaneously to reduce CO2 emissions – above all via of harmonizing stand-
ards and practices. 
After a long lasting process, these actors reached a consensus in 2004 to set up 
a new regulatory regime named “Single European Sky”, and to redesign institu-
tions such as Eurocontrol, which has been allocated to act as central authority 
for coordination of ATC in Europe (GOV-2) (Baumgartner/Finger 2014). 
One major step towards reorganising European airspace shall be the merger of 
41 national ATC sectors into nine Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) (Mölders 
2014). Since this concerted problem solution has been implemented via legal 
regulation, the arrow between the levels GOV-1 and GOV-2 is labelled “con-
trol”, indicating an attempt to steer European airspace regulation into the de-
sired direction of a unified airspace with common standards throughout the 
continent. 
Figure 7: A sample multi-level model of governance of socio-technical systems 
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However, many actors with partly divergent interests such as national govern-
ments, (mostly national) air-navigation service providers, (mostly national) 
manufacturers of ATC equipment, trade unions, the military and others are 
part of the – still ongoing – negotiations at the second level (GOV-2). The 
issue at stake is how precisely to implement the new regulation and how to 
transform European air traffic management, e.g. by redesigning airspace 
blocks. These negotiations currently have led to a “gridlock” 
(Baumgartner/Finger 2014). 
Although not fully completed, this new regulatory regime already sets the 
frame for future operational practices in aviation (GOV-3), since the centrali-
zation of rules and regulations goes hand-in-hand with an increasing decentral-
ization of operations, relying on new technologies such as ADS-B or TCAS 
and the capabilities of self-coordination on part of the actors (Weyer 2006). 
For example, the tasks of conflict-detection and separation (in case of another 
aircraft approaching) have been assigned to pilots, who have much more free-
dom to plan their routes in order to avoid conflicts and reduce delays (so-
called “free-flight”) (Hughes/Mecham 2004). The role distribution between 
ATC, airlines, airports and cockpit crews has changed considerably, shifting 
from central control by ATC to decentralized coordination of aviation actors, 
only monitored by ATC. 
Nevertheless, close to airports, pilots have to comply with strict rules of central 
control, and ATC can intervene, e.g. in order to reduce noise or emissions by 
charging high-noise aircraft (soft control) or banning them (strong control), 
thus creating incentives for behavioural changes. 
To conclude: At the operational level (GOV-3) we typically observe a patch-
work of control and coordination mechanisms, indicated in Figure 7 as “mixed 
modes”.  
The multi-level model also contains feedback loops, for example from opera-
tions to regulation or from regulation to politics. Data about increasing delays 
in aviation (as in the 1990s) served as an input to politics and triggered deliber-
ations about new measures and programs (as in the case of “Single European 
Sky”). 
4.3 Multi-level governance of infrastructure systems 
The multi-level model, as depicted in Figure 7, presents a typical constellation 
that can be found in the governance of modern infrastructure systems such as 
aviation, road transportation, or energy grids. It implements the idea of a nest-
ed, Russian-doll like combination of the mechanisms “control” and “coordina-
tion” at different levels, as debated in Sections 2.2 and 3.2. We can see several 
interconnected macro-micro-macro relations, since the output of “higher” 
levels serves as input for “lower” levels, while feedback runs inversely. 
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The same applies to processes within levels. Every system involved has its in-
ternal mechanism (be it coordination or control),6 which can be deciphered 
zooming in and modelled as macro-micro-macro relation (cf. Section 3). 
Mechanisms also guide exchanges with the external environment, i.e. other 
social systems at the same or other levels. 
As Figure 7 indicates, horizontal exchange at the respective level is typically 
performed in the mode of coordination, while vertical exchange between levels 
embodies control. But these details may differ from case to case and have to be 
investigated by empirical research. 
To sum it up: Governance of modern infrastructure systems typically consists 
of a combination of three distinct levels: 
1. coordination processes in negotiation systems (GOV-1), 
2. regulation of functional societal systems (GOV-2), 
3. operational control of the systems (GOV-3). 
We assert that one has to take into account the interplay of all these levels in 
order to understand the dynamics of complex systems and to tackle the prob-
lem of their governability. 
Of course, various other combinations of mechanisms and levels, as visualized 
in Figure 7, are possible.7 Which combinations work in practice and which 
ideal types of combinations can be derived, is only to be identified via empiri-
cal research. 
The strong assertion of our proposition is: In order to get the socio-technical 
system running, both the basic mechanisms (on each level) and the interaction 
between levels have to function properly. Successful governance has to solve 
all three problems (coordination, regulation, and control) simultaneously. 
4.4 Measuring governance 
As mentioned before, governance research is in need of indicators that are 
suited for assessing system performance and for comparing the actual out-
comes with the intended ones. The overview in Section 2.3 has shown that 
performance indicators may be i) goal achievement and payoffs, ii) the collec-
tive capacity to act in face of complexity, and iii) institutionalization and legiti-
macy. Additionally, indicators are needed for the system level as well as for the 
actor one. 
To proceed, we have to assume that it is possible to measure the output of a 
socio-technical system in different dimensions. However, there are no general-
purpose indicators, but the usefulness of different measures depends on the 
following distinctions. 
                                                 
6 For reasons of clarity these internal mechanisms have been omitted in Figure 7. 
7 It cannot be excluded that some cases will require adding even more levels. 
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Control vs. coordination 
Successful control can be measured by a target-performance comparison, 
which is based on the expectations of the controller as well as on performance 
data, e.g. concerning the number of delays in aviation. If the goal is to avoid 
mid-air collisions, control has been successful if no such event occurs. Simple 
quantitative indexes may be sufficient to indicate this. 
Successful coordination can only be measured via qualitative analysis of policy 
processes and outcomes: If different actor groups agree on a common prob-
lem solution and on concerted measures, e.g. to change the aviation system, 
coordination can be regarded as successful. 
Levels of governance 
Consequently, successful governance depends on the regarded level. It could 
either be the succeeding coordination of public and private actors resulting in a 
consensus (GOV-1), or the successful implementation of a regulatory regime 
(GOV-2). Furthermore, it could also be the achievement of a desired system 
performance with regard to economic and/or ecological dimensions (GOV-3). 
This distinction directs our attention again to the interrelatedness of levels. We 
assume that coordination at level GOV-1 is a necessary precondition of suc-
cessful governance but no end in itself, since successful control of level GOV-
3 is usually the final objective. Vice versa, control at level GOV-3 only makes 
sense if it is guided by a consented vision (e.g. reducing pollutions caused by 
aviation) at level GOV-1. 
Objectives of governance 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, control may be directed towards two main objec-
tives, which have to be measured differently: 
 If stability is the primary objective (e.g. safe and punctual air transport), 
an indicator that measures system stability is needed. Since no such in-
dicator has been available yet, we developed an index combining over-
all performance with the degree of fluctuations and applied it in (Adelt 
et al. 2014). 
 However, if system change is the primary objective (e.g. transformation 
of European airspace), there is the necessity of a measure that identifies 
the emergence of a new regime that has the potential to challenge and 
finally replace the old one. Frank Geels and Johan Schot have pro-
posed to define a market share of five percent of new technologies as 
one rough indicator (Geels/Schot 2007: 405). 
System and actor 
Although we assume that successful governance has to be measured primarily 
at the system level (e.g. the number of delays in aviation), actors matter as well. 
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Even if the global goals at the system level have been achieved, actors may 
nevertheless be dissatisfied because changing their behaviour into the desired 
direction they did not reach their individual targets. In the long run, this may 
impede or even hamper effective system control. 
Required indicators to measure individual performance can be constructed by 
the use of a target-performance comparison of each actor involved.  One can 
zoom in at every layer of the multi-level model in order to examine micro indi-
ces in more detail. 
Interim conclusion 
To conclude: All indicators proposed above are in accordance with the con-
cepts of Schimank, Torfing et al., and others, discussed in Section 2.3. They 
provide a way of constructing indexes which are able to measure the perfor-
mance of different social mechanisms at different levels of the nested govern-
ance structure. 
5 Conclusion and outlook 
This paper has developed an analytical perspective of governance that refrains 
from biased statements about the superiority of certain modes of governance. 
Instead, it provides an abstract framework that depicts governance as a specific 
combination of the basic mechanisms of control and coordination in multi-
level socio-technical systems. Which combinations work in practice and per-
form well (or even better than others) can only be investigated by empirical 
research and a comparison of different cases. 
However, this requires not only to collect empirical data and to present singu-
lar cases in virtue of storytelling. Instead, those empirical data have to be put 
into a multi-level model of governance in order to make them comparable and 
to decipher the mechanisms responsible for empirically observable variation. 
Hence, our multi-level model of governance does not answer the opening 
question whether complex socio-technical systems can still be governed. In-
stead, this model provides a framework and heuristic to investigate the issue of 
governability in a methodologically sound way. 
We assume that modelling socio-technical systems as well as modelling their 
governance may contribute to progress in governance research and may help 
solving seemingly endless debates on governance issues (cf. Kalter/Kroneberg 
2014). Modelling is only applied in some parts of sociological theory (Esser 
1993a, Schimank 2010), and more prominent in agent-based modelling and 
simulation (ABMS) of social systems (Gilbert 2007, Van Dam et al. 2013). 
However, both strands of research never got in touch with each other and - 
surprisingly, as discussed in Section 2 - never dealt with governance issues. The 
paper at hand tries to fill this gap by making the first step of developing a 
model of governance of socio-technical systems. 
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5.1  Limitations 
One limitation of our paper is the missing empirical test of the multi-level 
model of governance. Here we can refer to the short case study on air traffic 
control in Section 4.2 and another one on discontinuation of the regime of 
automobility, which – although not presented here – also seems to fit the 
model at first sight (Weyer et al. 2015). 
Parts of the model have been tested in (Adelt et al. 2014) where we imple-
mented the operational part (GOV-3) of the functional system road transpor-
tation and tested different modes of governance at the hands of computer 
simulation. 
5.2  Outlook 
Future research will probably concentrate on certain parts of the multi-level 
model of governance and neglect others, either by zooming out or by model-
ling the interplay between only two levels. Nevertheless, the long-term objec-
tive of research should be a comprehensive model of governance that can be 
applied to different societal sectors. Since the number of actors, interactions, 
factors, constellations, etc. will be high, agent-based modelling and simulation 
may become an indispensable tool for governance research.  
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